Prima Law Journal

PRIMA LAW JOURNAL
Vol. 1, No. 1, 31 Maret 2026, pp. 67-77

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERSIZED CABINET ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

This research examines the effectiveness of Indonesia's Kabinet Merah Putih under President Prabowo Subianto, widely described as an oversized cabinet with 109 ministerial-level officials, and its implications for political stability, economic performance, and constitutional structure amid global economic uncertainty. Using normative legal research with conceptual and statutory approaches, this study applies four theoretical frameworks: Soerjono Soekanto's Theory of Legal Effectiveness, Lawrence M. Friedman's Legal System Theory, Max Weber's Rational-Legal Bureaucracy Theory, and the UNDP's Good Governance principles. Findings indicate that the oversized cabinet poses significant challenges to bureaucratic efficiency, inter-ministerial coordination, and the state budget, which increased by more than 114 percent compared to the previous cabinet. The revision of Law Number 39 of 2008 into Law Number 61 of 2024 eliminated the 34-ministry ceiling, granting the president extensive prerogative power while risking bureaucratic politicisation. Conversely, the inclusive cabinet composition may strengthen coalition stability. This study concludes that the effectiveness of an oversized cabinet ultimately depends on coordination quality, official competence, and consistent adherence to good governance principles.

Keywords: Oversized Cabinet, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Good Governance, Constitutional Law.

Submited :December 20,2025
Reviewed :January 8,2026
Accepted :March 31,2026

A. Introduction

On 21 October 2024, President Prabowo Subianto formed the Kabinet Merah Putih (Red and White Cabinet), consisting of 109 members: 7 coordinating ministers, 41 ministers, 55 deputy ministers, and 5 ministerial-level officials.[1] This administration, which has nearly twice as many members as its predecessor, is considered the largest cabinet since the New Order era through the Reform period. The cabinet was formed by Presidential Decree Number 133/P of 2024, while Presidential Regulation Number 139 of 2024 governs the tasks and functions of each ministry.[2]

The Law on State Ministries Number 39 of 2008 was revised by the House of Representatives (DPR) on 19 September 2024 into Law Number 61 of 2024. A key amendment was the removal of the previous ceiling of 34 ministries, granting the president full authority to determine the number of

[1]Annisa, 2024. *'Kabinet Merah Putih Prabowo: 7 Menko, 41 Menteri, 55 Wamen'*, Tempo.co, 20 October 2024, accessed 23 April 2026.

[2]Aisyah, 2024 *'Peraturan Presiden Nomor 139 Tahun 2024 tentang Penataan Tugas dan Fungsi Kementerian Negara Kabinet Merah Putih'*.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.35730/6sz8xn28

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ministries required to run the government.[3] However, pursuant to Article 13(2) of the new Ministries Law, cabinet formation must still consider efficiency, effectiveness, scope of duties, proportionality of workload, and continuity of governance.

President Prabowo argued that a large cabinet was necessary to build a strong government and to embrace all national political forces, asserting that Indonesia's vast size and complex population require a bigger cabinet.[4] However, this assertion was met with considerable scepticism from academics, economists, and policy analysts. Senior economist Fadhil Hasan of the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF) argued that an overly large cabinet would be slow to function and would likely produce overlapping jurisdictions between ministries even as Prabowo sought to swiftly implement his priority programmes.

Researchers from the Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios) estimated the new cabinet would cost Rp777 billion annually in salaries and allowances a 114 percent increase compared to the previous cabinet's Rp387.6 billion per year. Over five years, the total projected increase reaches Rp1.95 trillion.[5] These figures exclude the costs of constructing new office buildings and establishing the organisational nomenclature for the fourteen new ministries created through the splitting of existing ones such as the simultaneous division of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights into three separate ministries.

This issue is made even more pressing by the backdrop of persistent global economic uncertainty. Indonesia's economy faces significant external risks arising from divergence in global economic growth, geopolitical pressures, and tight monetary policies in advanced economies.[6] In such circumstances, an effective, responsive, and collaborative government structure is indispensable for maintaining national economic stability.

Proceeding from these issues, this article formulates four research questions: (1) How can the effectiveness of an oversized cabinet be assessed through relevant legal theories? (2) What are the constitutional and normative foundations governing the balance between presidential prerogative and the principle of efficiency? (3) What are the impacts of the oversized cabinet on Indonesia's political stability, economic performance, and constitutional structure? (4) What do comparative analyses reveal, and what challenges lie ahead?

The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive juridical-academic study of the oversized cabinet phenomenon as a basis for reflection for state administrators and for the development of constitutional law scholarship.

B. Research Methodology

This study employs normative legal research methodology (normative legal research). As defined by Peter Mahmud Marzuki, legal research is a process of discovering legal rules, legal principles, and legal doctrines in order to address a legal issue.[7] The nature of this research is

[3]Kamil, 2024. *'UU Kementerian Negara Disahkan, Prabowo Bebas Buat Kementerian Tanpa Batasan'*, Kompas.com, 20 September 2024, accessed 22 April 2026.

[4]Novali Panji Nugroho, 2024. *'Kabinet Gemuk Prabowo: Solusi Pragmatis atau Efektif?'*, Kompas.com, 1 November 2024, accessed 22 April 2026.

[5]Seknas FITRA, 2024. *'Seberapa Besar Potensi Pembengkakan Anggaran karena Gemuknya Kabinet Prabowo?'*, seknasfitra.org, 2024, accessed 23 April 2026.

[6]Kasmiri, 2024. *'KSSK: Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Tetap Terjaga di Tengah Dinamika Geopolitik Global'*, lps.go.id, 2024, accessed 22 April 2026.

[7]Peter Mahmud Marzuki, 2017. *Penelitian Hukum*, 13th ed. (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group), p. 35.

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prescriptive, aiming to provide normative assessment and recommendations regarding what ought to apply in relation to the oversized cabinet issue.

The approaches utilised include: (1) the statutory approach, to examine the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 39 of 2008 in conjunction with Law Number 61 of 2024 on State Ministries, and Presidential Regulation Number 139 of 2024; (2) the conceptual approach, to analyse relevant legal theories based on scholarly doctrine; and (3) the comparative approach, to compare Indonesia's cabinet composition with other major countries. Primary legal materials consist of constitutional provisions and legislation, while secondary legal materials include academic literature, scientific journals in law and government studies, and policy documents. Analysis is conducted qualitatively using a descriptive-analytical method.

C. Discussion and Analysis

1. Legal Theoretical Framework for Assessing the Effectiveness of the Oversized Cabinet

To conduct a juridical analysis of the oversized cabinet's effectiveness, four complementary theoretical frameworks are applied. First, Soerjono Soekanto's Theory of Legal Effectiveness posits that structural policies such as cabinet formation can be influenced by five factors: (1) the law itself, (2) law enforcers or implementers, (3) facilities and infrastructure, (4) society, and (5) culture.[89] In the cabinet context, the second factor the capacity, integrity, and professionalism of ministers is of paramount importance, regardless of how sound the structural design of the cabinet may be.The third factor facilities and infrastructure also presents real problem several ministers who have been inaugurated do not yet have office buildings because their positions are new nomenclature.

According to public policy analyst Faqih Alfian, overlapping jurisdictions will inevitably arise in the cabinet, particularly in ministries that have been separated, and must be resolved promptly to improve operational effectiveness.[10] The legal factor the primary component of Soekanto's framework is also degraded without resolution of this jurisdictional overlap. Current regulations are insufficiently synchronised across ministries, contravening Soekanto's standard of legal effectiveness, which demands synchronisation of regulations both hierarchically and horizontally.

Constitutional law expert Mustain Nasoha, Director of PUSKOHIS at the Faculty of Sharia of UIN Surakarta, adds a perspective drawn from Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers, emphasising that the structure of government should focus on the strategic roles of each state institution. In an oversized cabinet, conflicting duties and lengthy coordination chains can disrupt governmental functions that should operate in concert.

Second, Lawrence M. Friedman's Legal System Theory holds that a legal system consists of three components: legal structure, legal substance, and legal culture.[11] Applied to the cabinet context: legal structure encompasses the institutional framework and ministerial working systems; legal substance includes the 1945 Constitution, the State Ministries Law, and Presidential Regulations governing authority; and legal culture encompasses work ethics, bureaucratic mentality, and how officials conduct themselves. Friedman argues that the system will not function properly without a

[8]Soerjono Soekanto, 1983. *Penegakan Hukum* (Bandung: Bina Cipta), p. 8.

[9]Soerjono Soekanto, 1988. *Efektivitas Hukum dan Penerapan Sanksi* (Bandung: CV. Ramadja Karya), p. 10.

[10]Faqih Alfian, 2024.*'Overlapping Kewenangan dalam Kabinet Gemuk: Perspektif Kebijakan Publik'*, NU Online, October 2024, accessed 23 April 2026.

[11]Lawrence M. Friedman, 1975.*The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), pp. 11–16.

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strong legal culture.[12] In the context of an oversized cabinet, this dimension is the most significant concern. Former Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Denny Indrayana warned that many ministers and deputy ministers were alleged to have legal problems and potential conflicts of interest with their financial backers.[13]

Third, Max Weber's Rational-Legal Bureaucracy Theory. According to Weber in Economy and Society (1922), bureaucracy is the most effective and rational type of organisation, characterised by structured specialisation of work, clear hierarchy, and strict formal rules.[1415] However, Mustain Nasoha emphasises that Weber's bureaucratic efficiency theory stresses that an ideal hierarchical system must demonstrate clear allocation of duties and authority. An excessively large cabinet may produce overlapping authority, which slows response to critical issues. Weber himself warned that a bureaucracy not managed on the basis of meritocracy and impersonality tends to generate clientelism and political patronage criticisms directed equally at the Kabinet Merah Putih, which some observers have characterised as a 'patronage cabinet'.

Fourth, the UNDP's Good Governance principles identify nine core characteristics: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, and strategic vision.[1617] The principle of efficiency and effectiveness measuring how well cabinet policies use available resources to achieve the public interest is directly contradicted by the more than 114 percent increase in apparatus expenditure without a proportional increase in public service output.

2. Constitutional and Normative Foundations: Presidential Prerogative versus the Principle of Efficiency

Constitutionally, Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution grants the president full prerogative to form a cabinet: paragraph (1) provides that the president is assisted by state ministers, and paragraph (2) states that the president appoints and dismisses those ministers. According to constitutional law expert Prof. Rudy Lukman of the University of Lampung, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia provides the basis for establishing ministries while fully delegating to the president the authority to appoint ministers as executive assistants.[18]

At the legislative level, the most significant change occurred when Article 15 of Law Number 39 of 2008, which previously capped the number of ministries at 34, was revised through a highly expedited legislative process completed by the 2019–2024 DPR. The amended provision, now contained in Law Number 61 of 2024, allows the number of ministries to be set flexibly according to the president's needs.[19]

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[12]Lesmana, 2021.*'Legal Culture dalam Birokrasi Pemerintahan Indonesia'*, Jurnal Hukum dan Pembangunan.

[13]Seknas FITRA, *'Seberapa Besar Potensi Pembengkakan Anggaran', Op. Cit.*

[14]Max Weber, 1978. *Economy and Society*, trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 956–969.

[15]Hidayat,2025. *'Teori Birokrasi Weber dan Penerapannya dalam Pemerintahan Modern'*, Jurnal Administrasi Publik.

[16]UNDP, 1977. *Governance for Sustainable Human Development* (New York: United Nations Development Programme), p. 2.

[17]DJKN Kemenkeu, 2024. *'Lima Prinsip Good Governance dalam Pengurusan Piutang Negara'*, djkn.kemenkeu.go.id, accessed 22 April 2026.

[18]Attar, quoting Prof. Rudy Lukman, 2024. *'Dasar Konstitusional Pembentukan Kementerian'*, NU Online, accessed 23 April 2026.

[19]Kurnia Yunita Rahayu, 2024. *'Politik Hukum Perubahan UU Kementerian Negara'*, Detik.com, 14 October, accessed 22 April 2026.

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From a legal-political analytical perspective, this amendment was not made without cause. The removal of the ministerial ceiling had two principal motivations. The first was to accommodate the transactional interests of coalition parties that had requested ministerial seats well before Prabowo became president. The second was the possible institutionalisation of the interests of oligarchic supporters seeking strategic positions in the cabinet. In this analysis, Friedman argues that legal substance emerging from transactional processes has a greater tendency to produce a legal culture oriented toward group interests rather than the public interest.[20]

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the Kabinet Merah Putih was established constitutionally and lawfully. Article 13(2) of the new State Ministries Law still requires that cabinet formation consider efficiency and effectiveness, scope and proportionality of duties, and the coherence and continuity of governance. The question, therefore, is not whether the cabinet is legally valid, but how these principles are applied in the actual operation of government.

3. Impacts of the Oversized Cabinet on Indonesia's Political Stability, Economy, and Constitutional Structure

a. Impact on Political Stability

From the perspective of political stability, a larger cabinet can be viewed as a strategy to consolidate power through an expansive power-sharing mechanism. Of the 106 ministers and deputy ministers inaugurated in the Kabinet Merah Putih, 45 are affiliated with coalition political parties: 15 from Gerindra, 11 from Golkar, 4 from PAN, and 4 from Partai Demokrat. This composition reflects the logic of transactional coalition-building that seeks to sustain support from all coalition members through the distribution of cabinet positions.

According to the fourth factor of Soekanto's Theory of Legal Effectiveness the element of society and legitimacy a representatively inclusive cabinet can enhance governmental legitimacy in the eyes of various interest groups.[21] However, constitutional law expert Satria Unggul Wicaksana of Universitas Muhammadiyah Surabaya cautioned that if cabinet composition is determined not by competence and capability but by power-sharing arrangements, it poses a grave risk: ministerial missions may diverge and fail to align effectively.[22]

The risk of sectoral silos between ministries poses a particular threat to policy coherence. From Weber's perspective, an ideal bureaucracy requires impersonality and a singular commitment to organisational objectives not to political parties, factions, or financial backers. The phenomenon of clientelism inherent in Weberian bureaucratic dysfunction, as noted by Surur,[23] can produce an entrenched official oligarchy that is difficult for the public to hold accountable. Questions of accountability become increasingly complex in a large cabinet with seven coordinating ministries: who is responsible when programmes misalign or cross-sectoral coordination fails?

b. Impact on Economic Stability and Fiscal Burden

The fiscal implications of the oversized cabinet are the most tangible. Based on Celios estimates referencing the Minister of Finance's salary standard with 100 percent performance allowances, the cabinet's salary and allowance bill amounts to an annual take-home pay of Rp137.8 billion for ministers and Rp70–80 billion for deputy ministers a 114 percent increase from the

[20]Friedman, *The Legal System, Op. Cit.*, p. 15.

[21]Soekanto, *Penegakan Hukum, Op. Cit*., p. 45.

[22]Satria Unggul Wicaksana, *'Sisi Positif dan Negatif Kabinet Gemuk Prabowo-Gibran'*, um-surabaya.ac.id, 20 October 2024, accessed 26 April 2026.

[23]Surur, *'Klientelisme Birokrasi', Op. Cit.*

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previous cabinet of 51 officials.[24] Monthly ministerial income can reach Rp150 million to Rp200 million.[25]

The UNDP's Good Governance principles highlight that this situation contravenes the principle of efficiency and effectiveness. For good governance, governmental processes and institutions must produce outputs meeting the needs of society while making optimal use of available resources. The significant increase in apparatus expenditure without a proportional increase in public service output represents genuine inefficiency.[26]

This problem is compounded by the need to construct fourteen new ministerial nomenclatures. Splitting the Ministry of Law and Human Rights into three ministries the Ministry of Law, the Ministry of Human Rights, and the Ministry of Immigration and Correctional Services requires new office buildings, the addition of echelon staff, and the establishment of new operational procedures, all of which demand additional budget beyond officials' salaries.[27]

This fiscal burden grows heavier amid global economic uncertainty. The Financial System Stability Committee (KSSK) has noted that, due to unabating geopolitical pressure, global financial market uncertainty, and divergence in global economic growth, capital flows to developing countries are severely limited.[28] In such circumstances, the state budget (APBN) must be optimised as a shock absorber for the national economy rather than being burdened by unproductive apparatus expenditure.

From the perspective of investor confidence, economist Aviliani noted that investors need assurances that the government can maintain economic stability and productivity despite the cabinet's size failing which investors risk withdrawing their capital.[29] This concern is reinforced by data from the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs showing that gross fixed capital formation (PMTB) growth in Q1 2025 was only 2.12 percent year-on-year, well below the 5.03 percent recorded in Q4 2024, partly because investors were still awaiting clarity on new government policy.[30]

It should nonetheless be noted that Indonesia's economy continues to demonstrate macroeconomic resilience. According to the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, economic growth remained around 5 percent throughout 2025, with investment realisation reaching Rp1,434.3 trillion from January to September 2025, and a trade surplus maintained for 66 consecutive months.[31] These data indicate short-term economic resilience, though further research is needed to determine precisely how the oversized cabinet structure contributes to this resilience.

c. Impact on Constitutional Structure

From a constitutional law perspective, the expansion of the cabinet directly affects the institutional architecture of the executive branch. With the addition of seven coordinating ministries and the splitting of several large ministries into smaller ones, new bureaucratic layers have emerged

[24] Fitra, 2024. *Seberapa Besar Potensi Pembengkakan Anggaran karena Gemuknya Kabinet Prabowo?* jakarta: seknas fitra.

[25]Fajri, *'Kabinet Gemoy Prabowo-Gibran, Bakal Efektif dan Efisien?*', Liputan6.com, 22 October 2024, accessed 23 April 2026.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Fitra, 2024. *Seberapa Besar Potensi Pembengkakan Anggaran karena Gemuknya Kabinet Prabowo?, Op., Cit.*

[28] Kasmiri, *'KSSK: Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Tetap Terjaga di Tengah Dinamika Geopolitik Global', Op., Cit.*

[29]Nurcahyani, quoting economist Aviliani, *'Investor dan Kepercayaan terhadap Kabinet Baru'*, Tempo.co, 22 October 2024, accessed 23 April 2026.

[30]Haspramudilla, *'Pertumbuhan PMTB Triwulan I 2025 Hanya 2,12 Persen'*, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian RI, 2025, accessed 22 April 2026.

[31]Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian RI, *'Perekonomian Indonesia 2025 Tetap Tangguh'*, ekon.go.id, 2025, accessed 22 April 2026.

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that complicate the chain of command. Political communication analyst M. Jamiluddin Ritonga observed that a larger cabinet tends to lengthen and complicate bureaucratic processes, greatly increases the likelihood of jurisdictional overlap, and impacts budget expenditure.[32]

The executive coordination architecture has also been significantly altered by the addition of ministerial layers within Friedman's legal structure component. The simultaneous presence of three deputy ministers in the Ministry of Finance, three in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and three in the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises raises questions about how duties and decision-making processes are distributed within a single ministry. This structure may give rise to jurisdictional conflicts, both de jure and de facto, destabilising legal management within those ministries.

Soekanto's third factor facilities and infrastructure presents a practical problem. Newly inaugurated ministers, such as Coordinating Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, did not yet have office buildings at the time of inauguration because their positions constituted new nomenclature. This clearly demonstrates that the structural effectiveness of the cabinet cannot be achieved instantaneously through official inauguration alone; it requires adequate institutional preparation.[33]

The checks and balances function in the constitutional order is also affected by the removal of the ministerial ceiling. The legislative process that produced Law Number 61 of 2024, completed in less than two months without a robust public legislative process, has been characterised as a decline in legislative oversight quality.[34] Under the rule of law principle one of the pillars of good governance a hurried legislative process without adequate public deliberation undermines the substantive legitimacy of the law produced.

A further element warranting attention is Presidential Regulation Number 137 of 2024, signed by President Jokowi in the final days of his term, which introduced fourteen special presidential advisors and special presidential envoys. The effectiveness of these positions is difficult to measure, raising questions about their public accountability and adding to the burden on the state budget. According to Weber, the proliferation of strategic positions without clear hierarchy and defined authority contradicts the rational-legal bureaucratic principle requiring transparent distribution of duties.[35]

4. Comparative Analysis and Challenges Ahead

As a comparative reference, the 48-ministry configuration of the Kabinet Merah Putih is not unique globally. India has 58 union ministries and 93 departments, while Nigeria has 46 ministries. In contrast, China maintains 26 ministries, Brazil 23, and the United States only 15 executive departments.[36] However, such comparisons must be approached with caution. India's large cabinet is well-organised through a clear two-tier structure Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State alongside a principle of decentralisation that grants genuine autonomy to regional governments.

Mustain Nasoha emphasises, drawing on Herbert A. Simon's perspective, that strategic function should matter far more than quantity. Effective governance requires an efficient cabinet that divides duties in a clear and measurable manner. Core ministries such as finance, defence, education, and health must be prioritised, while sectoral and technical ministries should be consolidated to reduce fragmentation of authority.

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[32] Fajri, 2024. *Kabinet Gemoy Prabowo-Gibran, Bakal Efektif dan Efisien?. Op., Cit.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Kurnia Yunita Rahayu, *'Politik Hukum Perubahan UU Kementerian Negara', Op., Cit.*
[35] Peraturan Presiden Nomor 137 Tahun 2024 Peraturan Presiden Nomor 137 Tahun 2024.
[36] Tiawarman, *'Perbandingan Jumlah Kementerian Indonesia dengan Negara Lain'*, Tempo.co, 2024.

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Under the UNDP's Good Governance framework, three principal dimensions will face significant challenges in the period ahead. First, accountability: how effectively can each ministry be held responsible for its performance to the public amid a disjointed bureaucratic structure? Second, transparency: how can cross-ministerial decision-making processes be insulated from group interest capture? Third, rule of law: whether all officials must submit entirely to the law. As Igor Dirgantara, Executive Director of Survey and Polling Indonesia, noted, anti-corruption efforts must be the paramount emphasis to demonstrate to the public that this government is far superior, since cabinet enlargement inevitably consumes vast public funds that must be accounted for.[37]

D. Conclusion

Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis presented, this study yields two primary conclusions. First, the effectiveness of an oversized cabinet cannot be assessed solely from structural quantity. Through the lens of Soekanto's Theory of Legal Effectiveness, the oversized cabinet faces serious challenges regarding the competence and integrity of implementing officials, as well as facilities and infrastructure that are not yet fully prepared. Through Friedman's Legal System Theory, the problems lie in a structure of increasing complexity with the risk of jurisdictional conflict, and in a legal culture that must transform from a patronage orientation toward professionalism. From the perspective of Weber's Bureaucracy Theory, the bloating of the bureaucratic hierarchy without clear and measurable task allocation contravenes the principles of rationality and specialisation that form the foundation of the ideal bureaucracy. From the UNDP's Good Governance principles, the more-than-114-percent increase in apparatus expenditure directly contravenes the principle of efficiency.

Second, the impact of the oversized cabinet on Indonesia's stability is ambivalent. On one hand, the inclusive cabinet composition with representation of 45 cadres from coalition parties has the potential to strengthen political coalition legitimacy and stability in the short term. On the other hand, the budget expansion projected to reach Rp1.95 trillion over five years, the potential for jurisdictional overlap among 14 new ministries, bureaucratic slowdown, and investor uncertainty constitute real risks to economic stability amid global uncertainty. In the constitutional domain, the removal of the ministerial ceiling through a hastily revised law opens avenues for bureaucratic politicisation that contradict the spirit of reform. The success of the Kabinet Merah Putih will ultimately be determined by the extent to which the government can demonstrate that the cabinet's size is commensurate with the quality of governance, coordination, and policy output that genuinely serves the interests of the people.

Third, comparative analysis reveals that cabinet size alone does not determine governance quality — institutional design and meritocratic culture are the decisive variables. Countries such as India, which manages 58 union ministries within a clearly structured two-tier Cabinet Minister and Minister of State system alongside genuine regional decentralisation, demonstrate that a large cabinet can function effectively when underpinned by rational bureaucratic architecture. Indonesia's Kabinet Merah Putih, by contrast, has yet to establish an equivalent clarity of hierarchy. Drawing on Herbert A. Simon's emphasis on strategic function over quantity, the fourteen newly created ministerial nomenclatures must be evaluated not by the political accommodation they enable, but by whether they produce measurable improvement in public service delivery. Future reform should consider consolidating overlapping sectoral ministries and establishing a transparent performance-evaluation mechanism benchmarked against UNDP Good Governance indicators, so that cabinet expansion translates into genuine institutional capacity rather than mere structural proliferation.

Fourth, the constitutional and normative challenges exposed by the oversized cabinet point toward a need for legislative reform that reinstates meaningful checks on presidential prerogative in cabinet formation. The expedited revision of Law Number 39 of 2008 into Law Number 61 of 2024 completed without robust

[37] Fajri, *'Kabinet Gemoy Prabowo-Gibran, Bakal Efektif dan Efisien?', Op., Cit.*

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public deliberation effectively removed the only statutory constraint on cabinet size, concentrating structural authority in the executive without commensurate accountability mechanisms. This contravenes both the rule of law pillar of Good Governance and the Friedmanian requirement that legal substance serve the public interest rather than transactional coalition demands. Going forward, the DPR should consider enacting a minimum-standard provision requiring that any expansion of cabinet nomenclature be accompanied by a formal competency assessment of prospective officials, an ex ante fiscal impact analysis, and a mandatory post-inauguration performance review within the first year thereby ensuring that the principle of efficiency and effectiveness embedded in Article 13 (2) of the State Ministries Law is operationalised rather than merely declaratory.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.35730/6sz8xn28

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.35730/6sz8xn28